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Abstract
This article discusses the issue of inclusion in peace negotiations, in particular the
Colombian peace process with the Fuerzas Armadas Revoluciona´rias de Colombia, with
special emphasis to a perceived tension between “direct” and “indirect” inclusive
initiatives. It argues that, as currently discussed by the Peace and Conflict literature,
inclusion tends to be seen as neutral and benign, which leaves little room for critical
discussions about the political contention behind peace negotiations deemed “inclusive.”
It thus proposes to discuss inclusion through the theoretical lens of political represen-
tation and apply such reflections to the specific case of the Colombian victims’ delega-
tions that travelled to Havana in 2014 in order to take part in the table’s discussions on
the victims and transitional justice topic. Ultimately, I will argue there was simultaneous
utilisation and rejection of the language of representation.
Resumen
Este art´ıculo aborda el tema de la inclusio´n en las negociaciones de paz, en particular el
proceso de paz de Colombia con las Fuerzas Armadas Revoluciona´rias de Colombia, con un
e´nfasis especial en la percepcio´n de la tensio´n entre iniciativas inclusivas “directas” y
“indirectas.” Argumenta que, como se discute actualmente en la literatura sobre Paz y
Conflicto, la inclusio´n tiende a considerarse neutral y benigna, lo que deja poco espacio
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para discusiones crı´ticas sobre las disputas pol´ıticas detra´s de las negociaciones de paz
consideradas “inclusivas.” Por lo tanto, propone discutir la inclusio´n a trave´s de la lente
teo´rica de la representacio´n pol´ıtica y aplicar tales reflexiones al caso especı´fico de las
delegaciones de vı´ctimas colombianas que viajaron a La Habana en 2014 para participar
en las discusiones de la mesa sobre las vı´ctimas y el tema de la justicia de transicio´n.
En u´ltima instancia, argumentare´ que hubo una utilizacio´n y rechazo simulta´neos del
lenguaje de representacio´n.
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Introduction
The Havana talks between the Colombian government and the FARC (formerly known as
Fuerzas Armadas Revoluciona´rias de Colombia) received high international praise for
their effort in promoting inclusion despite the fact civil society did not have negotiators at
the table. The recognition received by the process is mainly related to its creative promotion
of indirect inclusion without losing focus on the final target of reaching an agreement
between the parties. Although inclusion was traditionally viewed by scholars and practi-
tioners as a disruption to peace processes, the post–Cold War years witnessed a shift in
paths for dealing with conflict, especially internal ones. Recent studies revealed that
inclusive peace processes build more sustainable peace, which moved the discussion from
an “if” to a “how” – specialists began searching for ways of promoting inclusion while at
the same time avoiding that the echo of too many voices makes agreements impossible.
Within this tension between “direct” and “indirect” inclusions lie fundamental con-
cerns of historically excluded social groups, usually the ones hit the hardest by civil wars,
and relations not taken into consideration when thinking of inclusion as a vague and
benign entity. In order to reflect on this issue, I will draw from political theory of rep-
resentation and use it to try to understand the role of Colombian victims in the Havana
dialogues (2012–2016) from a fresh perspective. In 2014, the negotiation table agreed to
welcome five twelve-member delegations of victims into the discussions on the agree-
ment on victims and transitional justice. The initiative was celebrated for its symbolic
and practical effects, and will serve as an illustration for the theoretical discussion
provided by the first two sections.
Two main sets of questions will thus serve as a guide for this article. First, can civil
society actors serve as representatives of broader social sectors such as conflict’s vic-
tims? How would that work? More specifically, is it possible to say that the Colombians
chosen as victims’ delegates were representatives of the conflict’s victims? Debating this
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question entails contemplating the concept of representation in a wide and problematised
way, considering not only its electoral component but all aspects involved in the
establishment and conduction of representative relationships in non-institutionalised
settings such as peace processes. This involves a second set of questions: What can
the concept of political representation as a theoretical lens add to the current debate on
inclusion in peace processes? How is it different from using the inclusion lexicon?
Ultimately, I will argue the actors involved in the case at hand both utilised and
rejected the language of representation to define the victims’ delegations. Representation
was repeatedly rejected in official discourse, which stated the delegates were individual
participants that spoke on behalf of no one but themselves. At the same time, however,
all parties involved relied on a vocabulary of representativeness in order to claim and
attempt to gather a group of people that reflected the variety of Colombian victims. By
taking representation as a two-way street, a constant (additional) negotiation between the
table and society, it becomes possible to try and identify representative relationships in
peace processes and only then evaluate if they are inclusive or not – and, most impor-
tantly, inclusive of whom. In short, it allows for one to see inclusion as the result of
political contention and as a means for guaranteeing rights.
The article will thus mobilise theoretical and empirical strategies that are supposed to
complement and dialogue with each other. In the first section, I will provide an overview
of the discussion on inclusion in Peace and Conflict Studies. The following section will
propose a theoretical framework on political representation, relying on the works of
Hanna Pitkin and Andrew Rehfeld on the concept. Finally, the last section will discuss
the case of Colombia’s victims’ delegations in light of this framework, utilising for this
assessment the work of specialists, official declarations, media and think tank reports,
and impressions drawn from a few interviews.
From Exclusion to Inclusion
The Inevitability of Inclusion
The construction of lasting peace in contexts of deep-rooted, entrenched social conflict
gained renewed attention in the post–Cold War world. In the early 1990s, with the
unleashing of “new wars” (Kaldor, 2012) – especially intrastate conflicts triggered by
social, ethnic, and religious issues – traditional approaches of conflict resolution were
progressively deemed insufficient and gave way to projects of conflict transformation
and peacebuilding. Instead of aiming to stop immediate violence, transformation
attempts to engage different conflicts in a different way. By the end of the twentieth
century, boundaries between war and peace were even more blurred, and violent
conflict continued imposing the reinvention of political communities. It was not
enough to simply halt confrontations or try to negotiate a definite end to them anymore
– as conflict becomes more complex and ingrained, specialists say, so too should any
attempt of constructing peace.
In this scenario, experts such as John Paul Lederach (1997, 2003) contend that more
profound approaches to peacebuilding initiatives are needed, which no longer can
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artificially separate the battlefield and everyday life. Aside from stopping violence in the
present, it becomes necessary to address conflicts’ roots and transform relations in order
for peace to get a real chance. Dealing with pervasive conflict, therefore, entails its
contemplation over a wider time horizon, a careful analysis of its root causes and the
fostering of transformed relations among all parties (intentionally or not) involved in it.
Peace processes indeed move beyond stopping immediate violence and start directing
increasing attention towards past violations and future guarantees – for example,
establishing victim’s reparations and devising measures for non-repetition of human
rights abuses. These are part of a deeper agenda of social transformation and change in
interests, objectives, identities, and perceptions of former conflict parties, a project
capable of establishing less violent and more inclusive relationships.1
Thus, secretive and closed-door negotiations become less acceptable for those who,
despite not having picked up weapons, were somehow affected by those who did. If
negotiation tables are to put in place wholesome, long-term peace processes, it now
seemed reasonable to believe that negotiated agreements need to surface amidst a social
consensus robust enough to sustain their implementation. Building consensual solutions
that are also accepted and wilfully put in practice by the people becomes, for that reason,
one of the greatest challenges of contemporary peace processes.
This weaved together the issue of inclusion and the debate on peace sustainability and
legitimacy (see Zanker, 2014, 2018). As both the nature of conflict and its potential
solutions suffer changes throughout the last few decades, popular pressure for trans-
parency and participation gains strength, as well as the belief in the inclusion of diverse
social groups (other than conflict parties) as a source of legitimacy for peace processes.
For both practitioners and academics, understanding the motivations and effects of
inclusive peace processes turns into a relevant topic and a much-needed investigation.
There is a growing sense that, at the very least, the idea of openness to popular demands
needs to be conveyed by negotiation tables.
The practice of inclusion and the norm of inclusivity cannot be taken as substitutes –
while the first conveys the idea of something that either happens or not, the latter is
vaguer and involves “the assumption that an inclusive process has the best chance to be
seen as legitimate, to address all substantive issues and to reach a comprehensive and
sustainable peace agreement” (Von Burg, 2015: 8, my emphasis). The launch of the
United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation, in 2012, was a moment of con-
solidation for the discourse of inclusivity. The document, aimed to support mediation
efforts worldwide and help them succeed, lists the questions of inclusivity and national
ownership – alongside traditional aspects such as consent, impartiality, and international
law and normative frameworks – as some of their fundamentals. According to the United
Nations (UN), “[i]nclusivity refers to the extent and manner in which the views and
needs of conflict parties and other stakeholders are represented and integrated into the
process and outcome of a mediation effort” (UN, 2012: 11, my emphasis). The UN
cautions that exclusive consideration of conflict parties’ viewpoints by mediators may
overlook the needs of the wider public and, in effect, reward violence. It thus advises that
preconditions for participation are minimised, stimulating civil society engagement and
the inclusion of women in official delegations (p. 13).
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Inclusion versus Effectiveness
If, on the one hand, inclusion undeniably marches towards becoming an indispensable
topic of discussion and has been recognised as a necessary step for long-term peace
processes, it is not free of complex implications and ambiguities. The same experts who
see it as a source of legitimacy and a potential for durable peace warn that the echo of too
many voices obstructs the chances of a negotiation reaching an agreement. There is
broad consensus among both practitioners and specialists that the more people have a say
in a matter, the harder it gets to reach a collective decision regarding such matter (Kew
and Wanis-St John, 2008; Nilsson, 2012; Zanker, 2014). Of course, when the decision at
hand involves the end of an armed conflict, things get even more sensitive – depending
on the power accumulated by the parties, they may simply refuse to see it diluted among
additional participants and walk away before negotiations even begin (Paffenholz,
2014). In this point of view, peace negotiations deal with a trade-off between inclusion
and effectiveness – peace processes either get to include all relevant actors or be
effective enough in reaching a deal. In short, there is an inclusion versus effectiveness
dilemma in peace processes.
Although most authors generally agree that inclusive peace talks may face more
difficulties in the path towards successful closure, empirical research has also demon-
strated the positive impact and even the indispensability of inclusion for the durability of
post-agreement peace. Darren Kew and Anthony Wanis-St John (2008) and Desiree´
Nilsson (2012) have conducted studies on this topic and found similar evidence that, in
cases where there was inclusion of civil society actors during peace processes, a more
stable and durable peace was reached afterwards than in negotiations where they were
not involved nor allowed to participate. Exclusive negotiations, in other words, repre-
sented a much more fertile ground for the return of violence than inclusive ones.
At this point, two key yet contradicting conclusions may be recognised from such
investigations: (i) inclusion may make consensus harder to achieve in negotiation
tables; (ii) however, once reached, an inclusive consensus will have much stronger
chances of building sustainable peace. In sum, inclusion is considered to have both
negative and positive practical influence over the single goal of lasting peace. While it
turns agreements into much more difficult breakthroughs, delaying them and even at
times precluding them, it is now clear that an agreement without it may miss the
whole point of a peace process, which has to do not only with terminating a violent
conflict but also with avoiding its resumption. Inclusion is perceived, therefore, as a
paradoxical objective that represents both a risk and a necessity. Essentially, it is
portrayed by the literature as a chimera: albeit desperately needed, it seems incon-
gruent and impossible.
Trying to overcome this contradiction, several authors (Bell and O’Rourke, 2007;
Hemmer et al., 2006; Lanz, 2011; McKeon, 2004) have been trying to “unpack” what
inclusive peace processes are, what inclusion ultimately means, and which types of
inclusion are supposed to exert positive influence over the post-conflict phase. The
above-cited empirical conclusions on the benefits of inclusion gave way to a series of
additional questions: Does inclusion mean direct participation at the negotiation table?
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Who should be allowed to participate? How does the selection of participants take place?
Is there an ideal timing for participation to occur?
Whereas there are no definitive answers to such questions, the ponderations they
trigger are a starting point to deeper practical and theoretical analyses. David Lanz
(2011) tackled the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in peace processes by ques-
tioning how direct participation is delimited, that is, “who gets a seat at the table.” For
the author, two independent yet interacting factors help explain who makes the cut. First,
practical requirements tend to exclude whoever will complicate negotiations and include
those who “add value to the process and augment the chances of reaching a sustainable
settlement” (p. 281). The second factor is the normative dimension of participant
selection, that is, the validation of those selected by international norms and the values of
mediators and sponsors. If the two factors converge – for example, a candidate is seen as
relevant in practical terms and acceptable or necessary in normative terms – there are
higher chances he or she will be included. The opposite happens when both factors
suggest the exclusion of a given postulant. There is always a chance, however, that the
two factors do not match – a candidate is seen as practically relevant but normatively
reprehensible (e.g. terrorists), or he or she is normatively acceptable but seen as an
impractical addition to the table (e.g. social movements).
The emphasis given to the practical element in the choice of direct participants
reinforces the idea that, at some point, a peace process is faced with a choice between
effectiveness and inclusion. This is especially true for social groups such as victims’
movements, whose incorporation to the table can be considered overcrowding despite
their legitimate (and perhaps post-conflict pertinent, sustainability-wise) demands and
proposals. A few authors have attempted to overcome this dichotomy by urging
researchers to look further and identify alternatives to direct inclusion, claiming there are
other paths, observed in practice, that do not necessarily involve a seat at the table
(Paffenholz, 2014).
Thania Paffenholz strives to move away from the trap posed by this “exclusion–
inclusion dichotomy.” She chooses to focus, instead, on “how and under what conditions
inclusion can work” (2014: 70). Through a research project entitled Broadening Par-
ticipation,2 the author compiled nine modalities of inclusion previously exercised by
civil society actors in peace processes (see Table 1). From the most direct model of
participation (i.e. sitting at the table) to the least (i.e. mass mobilisation), Paffenholz
clarifies that there is no direct correspondence between specific peace negotiations and a
single inclusion modality. What actually happens is a “mix and match” – inclusion does
not always translate into only one method for each peace process, often, instead, com-
bining more than one modality at a time. Direct participation, as one would expect,
encounters resistance from conflict parties, which forces civil society actors to associate
creativity and social pressure in their attempts to influence the negotiation table’s agenda
and decision-making.
With all this in mind, a few reflections come up. The first issue concerns the already
cited question of practical and normative realms of inclusion and the relationship
between them (Lanz, 2011). Even though the effects from practical and normative
factors of inclusion are probably too difficult to dissociate on the ground, the “attainable”
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observation of norms, conditioned by practical needs, may well serve to instrumentalise
inclusive initiatives as empty mechanisms of legitimisation with little or no actual
impact. Franzisca Zanker argues the Conflict Resolution literature on inclusion treats
legitimacy in a circular way – “[p]ublic buy-in results in legitimacy, and because of
legitimacy, there is public buy-in” – without actually diving into its mechanisms
(2018: 7). A crucial part of further dissecting the notion of inclusion in peace processes
thus involves overcoming a view of legitimacy that is not only circular, I would say,
but also static and depoliticised, as if it were one thing, one uncontroversial goal
associated with societal inclusion. In this regard, one must keep in mind legitimacy
means different things for different people, and this is absolutely central for discussing
the role of inclusion and its implications. As Zanker stresses, “the very idea of
legitimacy in contemporary peacebuilding and inclusive negotiation debates results in
questions of how legitimacy is actually constructed, as well as for whom and by whom”
(p. 25, my emphasis).
Also, it is worth highlighting that the devising of rules and “practical requirements” in
the selection of participants cannot be taken as a given or seen as neutral – they have to
be seen as results of political contention. Perhaps no collectivity better expresses this
than a conflict’s victims. Tami Amanda Jacoby (2015) differentiates between victimi-
sation and victimhood, tracing a path between the first and the second in which people
perceive a harm suffered as wrongdoing beyond “ordinary state of affairs,” seek redress,
and organise politically in order to be recognised and compensated as victims (pp. 527–
528). Jacoby sees the construction of victimhood identity as a contested process, arguing
“[it] depends on a choice, however limited in its options, to use the experience of harm as
the basis for identity, subject to the expectations of a political culture and its power
relations” (2015: 527). Victims will be precisely the focus of the last section of this
article, which will approach the role of Colombian victims in the Havana talks.
The purpose of inclusivity as a norm therefore lies not only on making “negative
peace”3 more effective, but also on addressing structural inequalities and opening up the
way to the realisation of rights. The identification of the “right” or “effective” inclusion
Table 1. Paffenholz’s Nine Modalities of Inclusion.
Paffenholz’s Modalities (2014)
1. Direct representation at the negotiation table, in a separate delegation or incorporated into an
existing delegation
2. Observer status at the negotiation table
3. Consultative forums that run parallel to official negotiations
4. Less formal consultations with civil society
5. Inclusive post-agreement mechanisms
6. High-level civil society initiatives, e.g. problem-solving workshops
7. Public participation, e.g. public hearings
8. Public decision-making, e.g. referenda
9. Mass action, e.g. protests
Source: Based on Paffenholz (2014).
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encompasses opening up the black box where it is often placed and looking at what/who
allows for it to take place and in what manner. In other words, the mostly technical
debate on inclusion, as it defines and redefines its potential modalities, needs to
recognise its own political origins and implications.
From Inclusion to Representation
Between the cautious perception of direct inclusion – everyone wants a seat, not
everyone can get one – and the intention to move past this by looking at “indirect”
modalities of inclusion, there needs to be a discussion of peace negotiations as political
and representative ventures. The added value of introducing representation into this
equation pertains, in particular, the exposure of exclusions that remain ingrained in the
current literature’s discourse of inclusion. Such exclusions cannot be unveiled nor
evaluated unless they are taken as part of the political struggles that permeate peace
processes. Figuring out how inclusion emerges at different levels demands a closer look
at the elements mediating direct and indirect loci of inclusion. It also demands an
analysis of the parameters and categorisations that shape and are shaped by the con-
secutive political decisions involved in letting certain sectors of society, but not others,
reach the table and/or exercise certain roles. The choice of who to involve matters, as do
the methods employed in aggregating those who wish to participate.
Another crucial aspect of this investigation concerns questioning what lies within the
concept of inclusion. In formal political contexts, “inclusion” usually refers to the
integration of a certain sector of society into an institutionalised political procedure – for
example, the extension of the right to vote to women. There is no singular definition for
what Conflict Resolution authors mean when they use this word, which, in its vagueness,
ultimately serves to depoliticise a debate that is political to the core. Thus, the technical
use of the language of inclusion needs to be broken down to account for politically driven
choice of actors for all levels of a peace process, as well as the roles played by them.
Much like “inclusion,” both “participation” and “representation” (and their accom-
panying lexicons) are found in the literature of inclusive peace processes; however, there
is seldom a semantic or theoretical exercise of differentiating the three words, which
become muddled in their application.
The use of the word inclusion in peace processes, in the absence of formal political
instances and procedures, refers to both participation (individual engagement in name of
oneself) and representation (engagement of a representative acting on behalf of one
person or a collective of people). At each modality of inclusion, from more direct to more
indirect, actors may be participants, representatives, or both. As one would expect, the
closer to the negotiation table, the heavier the weight of representative mechanisms
versus participatory ones. Political representation is herein taken in its wider inter-
pretation (Urbinati and Warren, 2008), not taking for granted its recurrent “crises.” It is
thus not excluded that social actors other than elected and government officials do
exercise representation in various contexts, especially if one considers the legitimacy
crisis experienced by party politics worldwide and the increasing capture of represen-
tation by non-institutionalised and “outsider” social movements (Castells, 2018). Civil
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organisations may exercise what Lavalle et al. (2006) call “representation by inter-
mediation,” which in fact makes participation and representation harder and harder to
differentiate. Even if most of the time not explicitly, the literature on inclusion presumes
that, faced with the impossibility of massive social participation, civil society and social
movements become natural representatives of those absent from negotiation tables
(Zanker, 2018: 6).
More than drawing borders between participation and representation, however, or
artificially seeing society as the locus of participation and the negotiation table as the
locus of representation, the intention is to dissect what is meant by these expressions,
especially when it comes to the establishment of rules and the distribution of political
functions in a negotiation process. Representation, be it institutionalised or not, demo-
cratic or not, embodies a common language and lens of analysis that is able to act as a
common thread between the before, the during, and the after of an armed conflict. Unlike
the somewhat nebulous idea of inclusion, the concept of representation sheds light on
social pressures and power distributions that have much to say about the decisions being
made at negotiations. Instead of using the inclusion lexicon, therefore, I choose to
consider peace processes non-institutionalised representative instances that may, in turn,
be deemed inclusive or not. The contrast between representative and participatory means
of inclusion, on the other hand, will also serve to highlight the elucidatory potential of
political representation in better grasping what inclusion is, or should be, in peace
processes. The fourth section will look into the meanings attached to the words
“participation” and “representation” in official discourse regarding inclusion, as well as
the tensions involved in and between such labels.
The Concept of Representation
Representation is a multifaceted, complex concept that precedes its political application.
Its current political interpretation, however, often translates into an automatic associa-
tion with contemporary electoral democracy. Beyond the ballot, political representation
is a broader and older phenomenon than modern democracy, recognisable in a gamut of
political interactions that, as peace processes, escape traditional, institutionalised set-
tings. In this sense, Hanna Pitkin (1967) observes that the basic meaning of political
representation in fact has not changed a lot since the seventeenth century and its for-
mulation by Thomas Hobbes (1994). In its shortest, simplest etymological definition,
Pitkin deems it “the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless
not present literally or in fact” (pp. 8–9). Other authors observe representation does not
even need to be legitimate or just – it merely needs to be collectively credible. Andrew
Rehfeld argues it “results from an audience’s judgment that some individual, rather than
some other, stands in for a group in order to perform a specific function” (2006: 2). In
peace negotiations, it is possible to say those engaged in formal and informal instances
are groups of representatives speaking on behalf of larger segments of society – the
represented – with the shared function of stopping violence.
In The Concept of Representation, Pitkin proposes looking at apparently opposing
takes on representation as pieces of the same puzzle. The author pinpoints two main
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criteria in such effort. First, there are formalistic views of representation, which identify
it with the formal procedures that establish or verify it. The second one concerns the
actual substance of representative activity, be it regarding the characteristics of the
representative or the actions he or she takes on behalf of his or her represented con-
stituency (see Figure 1 above).
Formalistic approaches concern either the “before” or the “after” of representation,
claiming previous authorisation or posterior accountability of the representative as its
defining trait. Most important between the two is the authorisation view, which
maintains that representation is a transfer of authority from represented to represen-
tative. This was the unlimited Hobbesian interpretation of the social contract as early
as the 1650s, but it is also a huge protagonist of modern democracies’ electoral ele-
ment. The duration and extent of authorisation, as well as the method utilised to
recognise it, are subject to debate. Still, it leaves out fundamental aspects of repre-
sentation; “it cannot tell us what ‘misrepresenting’ or ‘misrepresentation’ might be, nor
can it explain the noun ‘representativeness’ or the adjective ‘representative’” (Pitkin,
1967: 49). Who is the right representative for a certain social group? Once chosen, can
a representative act as he or she wishes, regardless of his or her constituency’s pre-
ferences? The conflict put in motion by these questions demonstrates the importance of
attaching the formalistic debate to another one, concerning the actual content of rep-
resentation – namely who the representative should be, and what he or she should do
while acting in name of those represented.
These last two issues translate precisely into the two interpretations that make up the
substance of representation according to Pitkin. First, she says representation can work
as a substitutive tool, such that representatives stand for the ones they represent, taking
their places where they cannot be present. Secondly, one can also argue representatives are
in fact acting for their constituencies. Once formally delineated, therefore, two dimensions
to the substance of representation emerge: let’s call them “presence” and “action.”
Figure 1. Hanna Pitkin’s Typology (1967). Source: Based on Pitkin (1967).
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The central question around the issue of presence, as mentioned, is who is best suited
for the job – should he or she be similar to the ones represented or not? For instance, is a
conflict victim best suited to represent the conflict’s victims as a collective during a
peace process? Based on this, Pitkin concludes there are two main types of “stand for”
representation: (i) it can be descriptive, prioritising similarity between representatives
and represented, and aiming at overall proportionality in representation; (ii) it can be
symbolic, relying on bonds forged between representatives and represented, allowing the
first ones to serve as symbols of the second without necessarily being similar to them or
belonging to the same social group. The element of action, in turn, raises the essential
question of whether the representative should strictly act as the represented would, and
how far s/he can act differently from the wishes of the represented – a mandate versus
independence dilemma.
It is the substance of representation that allows us to think in terms of representa-
tiveness, or deem a representative “good” or “bad.” Pitkin reminds us, in this sense, that
representation entails simultaneous similarity and difference. This means neither com-
plete faithfulness nor complete difference translate into actual representation, which
requires, ultimately, a delicate balance between the metaphorical presence/action of the
represented and the literal presence/action of the representative.
Each of the main features of representation portrayed by Pitkin is relevant for
reframing inclusion in peace negotiations. From formalistic representation, more
specifically the authorisation view, I may interrogate which procedures and categor-
ising methods surround the choice of participants as well as the structuring of nego-
tiation tables and other informal instances pertaining peace processes. Substantive
representation may inspire a reflection on the opposition between descriptive and
symbolic representatives in negotiations, stimulating the seizing of such concepts to
discover possible advantages and disadvantages of having minority groups represent
themselves. It may also bring attention to the fact that securing descriptive or symbolic
presence does not guarantee representative action nor representative results. The next
section will try to take the first steps towards a conceptual framework capable of
evaluating not only how political representation gains life on the negotiation table, but
also how it is portrayed in practice.
Political Representation in Peace Process Structuration
The dynamics around peace processes are generally shaped before negotiations occur,
during prenegotiations. Despite the fact they are frequently mentioned as an essential
phase of a peace process by authors of diverse perspectives, this is a phase seldom talked
about due to its fragility and secrecy. As the “negotiations that unleash negotiations,”
they tend to prioritise getting parties to the negotiation table, staging their very first
contact and a lot of decisions that are dragged throughout the whole negotiation and
implementation processes.
It is precisely during prenegotiations, for example, that most direct participants are
selected, the overall format and rules afterwards adopted by the negotiation table are
defined, as well as the agenda that will guide the conversations (Saunders, 1985;
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Zartman, 1989). This is also a phase that tends to be conducted in secret and with limited
access to actors other than the parties and international mediators and sponsors. The
characteristics of the table and its participants, once defined, probably unfold into more
or less openness to other forms of inclusion, as well as reactions from indirect initiatives
in order to influence the work of the delegations.
The authorisation view of representation, in its classical interpretation, seems
incompatible with “informal” political scenarios such as peace negotiations. However,
understanding this idea of authorisation – or lack thereof – may be informative. Andrew
Rehfeld (2006) made an effort to demystify the idea that all representative endeavours
involve being authorised, observing that the literature’s focus on procedural criteria for
authorisation ignores cases of “illegitimate” or “unauthorized” representation (p. 3). In
this sense, he argues
the general claim that political representation necessarily involves being authorized by
those you represent is just false: even democratic political representatives represent people
who did not authorize them to act, say those who voted for the losing candidate or those who
did not vote at all. (p. 10)
An alternative interpretation would be that someone does authorise representation,
but this someone is not always the same person who will be – well or badly – represented
upon such authorisation.
According to Rehfeld, the habit of equalising political representation and represen-
tative democracy blurs the fact that the formal selection of a representative involves
more separate deciding roles than we can ordinarily put our fingers on. He highlights,
then, that the choice of representatives depends on three main actors: the represented, the
audience, and the selection agent. The represented consists of the group of people whose
interests will be defended by the representative. The audience is the group before whom
the representative, according to specific decision rules, needs to be considered accep-
table. The selection agent, finally, is the one who chooses a representative among all
candidates deemed “qualified” by the audience’s decision rule, in order to perform a
specific function.
Rehfeld maintains that these three roles are hard to distinguish in practice because
they happen to coincide in representative democracies, where represented, audience, and
selection agent are the same collectivity of people: the electorate (see Figure 2 below).
The “qualified set” of candidates to representative positions, in turn, is defined through
electoral law and party politics. The representative’s function, finally, is likewise a
predictable decision guided by law. When representation escapes this format, as is the
case with intermediate representative roles taken up by civil society organisations
(Lavalle et al., 2006), or the attainment of peace through negotiated settlements, a few
fundamental questions come up: who shapes the (non)authorisation initiating repre-
sentative activities, who makes up the “qualified set” of candidates to become repre-
sentatives, who exercises each of the three above-cited roles (which, unlike what is seen
in representative democracies, do not perfectly overlap), and how functions are dele-
gated to such representatives.
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In the absence of institutions that provide political predictability to a peace process,
Rehfeld’s model and Pitkin’s typology are a good starting point for scrutinising the
establishment of rules, the selection of decision-makers and the roles attributed to
them. I will thus analyse two main elements defining negotiation table participants,
each illustrated by one side of the Venn diagram in Figure 3: their choice and the
function they perform.
First, figuring out the choice of participants at negotiation tables means exploring
the left side of Figure 3. The choice of representatives requires the identification of
the audience, the selection agents, and the represented involved in this process. The
interaction between them is revealing of the substance of representatives chosen to sit
at the table, and of whether there is room for descriptive representation of margin-
alised sectors of society or not. Identifying these three actors and how they interact
Representave
Decision Rule Funcon
Represented
=
Selecon Agent
=
Audience
Figure 2. Representative Selection in Representative Democracies. Source: Based on Rehfeld
(2006).
Audience
Selecon 
AgentRepresented Representave
Funcon
Figure 3. Representative Selection in Peace Processes. Source: Based on Rehfeld (2006).
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with each other in peace processes can shed light on structural attributes that may thus
prove decisive for a better understanding of inclusive peace. In this sense, it is also
important to estimate where conflict parties, international mediators, and popular
movements fall within these three categories. During prenegotiations, the selection
agents of direct participants most likely will be the conflict parties themselves,
mediators, and international sponsors. The parties may also prefer to establish general
parameters and criteria for such choice, delegating it to experts or actors seen as
neutral by the general public.
The audience, in turn, has a strategic role that deserves special attention. Rehfeld
notes that the formal existence of representation depends not on the observation of
decision rules, but on the beliefs of the audience. He ponders that “representation
depends formally on the recognition by an audience, not on the coherence (or lack of
coherence) of a purported case to a set of rules that the audience uses. In short, it is the
beliefs of the Audience that matter, not whether those beliefs are true” (2006: 15). It is
therefore important to emphasise the role of the audience’s perception in defining
whether or not an actor is eligible to be a representative and if he or she can indeed be
considered a representative. As Rehfeld stresses in his work, representation may also
unfold “illegitimately” and may rely, more than it does on legitimacy, on the perception
(and perhaps acceptance) that it is indeed happening.4
Even more so than the other two actors listed above, the audience ends up cen-
tralising, in great measure, the political disputes that surround peace negotiations. By
concentrating the power to determine decision rules on representation and, based on its
own beliefs, decide whether such rules were observed or not, the audience accumulates
another kind of power: it sets the parameters that gather or break up agendas; it gets to
categorise people by grouping them together in this and not that way. Modes of
organising constituencies in societies facing reconstruction are thus a source of power
less recognised than those most associated to violent conflict. Take, for example, the
practice of gerrymandering5 in established political systems: classification matters,
and it should matter all the more so when overall political rules are up for grabs and in
process of renegotiation.
It is noteworthy, then, that these three protagonists in the choice of representatives are
not fixed categories, but fluid objects of political contention. Civil society actors can try
to force their way into the represented category via public advocacy (i.e. entering the
audience), with the sole purpose of influencing decision rules, the beliefs of the audience
in general, and, consequently, the choice of direct participants by selection agents. The
inevitable incorporation of the issue of inclusion in conflict resolution over the last
decades may have (i) widened the portion of society that makes up the audience and, as a
consequence, forced the reviewing of decision rules to incorporate inclusivity norms,
and/or (ii) shifted perceptions of an audience that used to accept or even defend exclusive
decision rules, but no longer does. If the involved audience is now demanding for
decision rules that consider not only practical, but also normative standards such as
inclusivity, there are higher chances more diverse social groups will join the
“represented” category, be it through descriptive representatives or symbolic ones. But
let’s not forget the role of the audience’s beliefs in these dynamics: if it believes its rules
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are being respected, the chosen representatives will be deemed acceptable. Having said
all of the above on the issue of choice, thus, two important points come up. First, the
existence itself of political representation is a constant negotiation that is, in turn,
always up for contestation. Second, not only do the represented constitute represen-
tation, representation also constitutes the represented, helping define represented
groups’ identities by categorising them and claiming that they exist in a certain way.
Represented groups are not a static, given reality that are simply there to be appre-
hended – they are forged by selection agents and audience and shaped by the power
dynamics under which they function.
The second main element of representation mentioned above is the function it is
supposed to perform. Rehfeld stresses that “any particular case of representation is
always context-limited: it is defined by the Function towards which it aims, and that
Function always specifies that ‘The Representative stands for the Represented in order
to do X’” (2006: 17). The function is therefore the starting point of representation, and
it is also crucial to determine the audience it activates: “the Function of representation
specifies who the relevant parties are; that is, who is the Audience” (p. 9). The more
strategic the representative’s function, of course, the more impervious to activism
powerful actors tend to become. This means that marginalised sectors of society will
have better chances of getting descriptive representatives when the function they are
expected to perform is not considered too strategic by conflict parties and negotiation
sponsors. Aside from the “presence” factor, another important point to consider
regarding function is the “action” dimension mentioned in the previous subsection.
Pitkin raises the issue of a “mandate versus independence” dilemma concerning a
representative’s actions and his or her constituency’s demands. Rehfeld labels this
“performance” – the final result of a representative process. It is necessary not only to
ask what function was attributed to a certain actor, but also in which kind of perfor-
mance it resulted.
The different categories and roles of representation are helpful for building another
version of inclusion in the sense that they capture it in a wider manner. More than
placing inclusive initiatives on a “direct–indirect spectrum,” aiming for an elusive (and
flattened) goal of legitimisation, representation allows for their dynamic dissection in
every step of the way, identifying how and why some were included but others were
not, what kind of functions are delegated to civil society representatives and what were
the effects of their inclusion. The representational lens, as a common language uniting
the place of society before, during, and after peace processes, also allows for an
approach that sees inclusion as a constant political negotiation, resulting from power
dynamics, instead of deeming it a benign and instrumental element. In this sense, the
recognition or rejection of representative relationships, their goals and processes reveal
key for a deeper grasp on inclusion. In hopes of illustrating the theoretical ideas raised
by this section, next I will evaluate the issue of inclusion in the context of the
Colombian peace process with the FARC (2012–2016). More specifically, I will look
at the case of the victims’ delegations sent to Havana in 2014 in light not of the usual
inclusion language, but of the concept of political representation, in order to explore
what this approach may bring to the table.
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Inclusion and Representation in the Colombian Peace Process:
The Case of the Victims’ Delegations
The Colombian conflict has been unfolding for over fifty years and involves several
actors – not only the armed guerrillas and the government, but also narcotraffickers,
paramilitary groups, and bandas criminales (“bacrims”) – which helps explain its level
of complexity and the difficulty encountered in reaching a peaceful closure for it. Its
origins may be found in a deep-rooted association between politics and violence in the
country, the people’s exclusion from politics as an instrument of social change, as well as
issues with land use, ownership, and distribution. The conflict between the government
and FARC originated precisely in rural areas in the 1960s, when the guerrilla was
founded following years of severe violence in the country. This period (1948–1958),
known as La Violencia, resulted in an elite political pact that further eluded the popu-
lation’s hopes of receiving state protection and having their social rights guaranteed
through non-violent channels (Skidmore and Smith, 2005).
In conflicts as long and complex as this one, victimisation is naturally a huge issue to
be addressed once peace and reconciliation efforts are launched. Colombia’s conflict has
left more than 8.4 million victims to date – over 17 per cent of the population.6 The
difficulty of dealing with victimhood in this context thus has to do with the multiplicity
of angles involved: a wide variety of actors committed a wide variety of crimes against a
wide variety of people. Victimisers include not only the guerrillas but also paramilitary
groups and the state itself. Victims include people from urban and rural areas, from
different social classes, ethnicities, genders, and so on. On top of the list of victimising
crimes by far is internal displacement (currently more than 7.5 million), followed by
homicide (over 1 million, including direct and indirect victims) and death threats
(400,000).7 Other perpetrated crimes include forced disappearance, kidnapping, sexual
violence, torture, and the recruitment of minors.
After decades of confrontations, a handful of failed peace negotiation attempts, and a
particularly belligerent few years under former president A´lvaro Uribe in the 2000s, then
president Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC established exploratory talks and finally
agreed to initiate negotiations. In August 2012, the parties announced that, after a phase
of prenegotiations, they would be pursuing a peaceful solution to their conflict. At
the occasion, they signed and released the General Agreement for the termination of the
conflict and the construction of stable and durable peace, which stated their intentions, the
rules of negotiation and the agenda it would discuss. Over the four following years later,
the Havana dialogues – guaranteed by Cuba and Norway, with support from Chile and
Venezuela – concluded discussions of their six-point agenda8 and reached an agreement.
Although the process was structured as a bilateral negotiation that did not foresee a
high volume of direct participation or the granting of permanent seats to civil society
representatives, the negotiation table made it a point to adopt an inclusive discourse
particularly reliant on indirect participation initiatives. These initiatives, which are now
seen by experts as successful and innovative (e.g. see Herbolzheimer, 2016; Maldonado,
2017), can be attributed not only to the spaces formally stipulated by the table, but also to
the pressure exerted by civil society organisations throughout the process.
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There were three official inclusion channels established by the table from the
beginning: the launch of a website (as well as physical forms distributed in post offices
and town halls) for submission of suggestions from the population, the thematic forums
held at regional and national levels, and consultations with experts and civil society as
seen fit by the table. In a recent publication, the government explicitly alluded to Paf-
fenholz’s modalities, identifying its early inclusive initiatives with modalities 3 and 4,
and also adding modality 8, that is, the posterior approval of the agreements by the
popular vote in a referendum9 (Alto Comisionado para la Paz, 2018: 218–219). Other
means of inclusion, such as the creation of the Gender Subcommission, were clear results
of civil society co-ordination. Lastly, the forums on the topic of victims became a
platform for the appointment of victims’ delegations tasked with discussing the issue
with the negotiators. These delegations will be the focus of this section.
It is important to highlight that the absence of modality 1 of inclusion (and perhaps
also of 2) does not eliminate representative dynamics from this process. Political rep-
resentation is present, at the very least, due to the fact one of the parties was a demo-
cratically elected government. But it also holds if I choose to interpret political
representation as something that goes beyond formal authorisation and can occupy loci
other than formal politics. While the Havana talks prioritised a language of political
participation – in the first version of the sixty-three-page agreement on victims, the word
“participation” showed up seventy-three times – the employment of the representation
lexicon was selective, as discussed ahead. One can notice a lack of clarity in the
employment of the two words by the government – it declared, for example, that the
process witnessed “a model of participation that depended on multiple interactions, with
distinct degrees of representation and inclusion” (Alto Comisionado para la Paz, 2018:
226, translated from Spanish). This is detrimental to a deeper understanding of inclusion
in peace processes.
This tension is especially evidenced in the case of the victims’ delegations, in which
the intensity of having victims invited to the table (albeit temporarily) led to simulta-
neous utilisation and rejection of the language of representation. It is fitting to enquire,
then, if the role played by the delegations can be labelled representation or not, applying
the framework discussed above in an attempt to look at inclusive initiatives such as this
one from a different standpoint than usual. I am not searching to provide definite answers
in raising this question, which is why it is important to separate the perception of the
actors involved on the nature of the delegates’ roles and, on the other hand, the choice of
representation in a wider sense as a lens of analysis.
The starting point for this discussion in the Colombian peace process was the
acceptance by decision-makers that the victims had to be placed at the centre of the
whole peace process. This meant that both parties had to recognise their responsibility in
the victimisation of the Colombian population throughout the conflict and vow not to
“exchange impunities” (Presidencia de la Repu´blica, 2014). Having done that, the parties
acknowledged that victims deserve not only the truth about what happened to them and
their loved ones, reparations and guarantees of non-repetition, but also a direct voice in
this phase of negotiations. Given the brief scenario on the conflict’s victims provided
above, it becomes clear that including them in a fair way was no easy task – especially
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considering the delegations amounted to 60 people out of a universe of 8.4 million
victims. Such difficulty seems to simultaneously reinforce and challenge the choice of
political representation as a lens of analysis.
On 7 June 2014, driven by the above commitment, the parties released a joint com-
munique´ in which the principles that would guide the debates on victims were estab-
lished.10 This declaration determined the holding of regional and national thematic
forums11 by the Centro de Pensamiento y Seguimiento al Dia´logo de Paz (a think tank
part of the National University of Colombia) and UN Colombia. It also announced that a
first delegation of victims would soon fly to Havana to “present their proposals and
expectations about peacebuilding in the territories and about the satisfaction of the
victims’ rights” (Alto Comisionado para la Paz, 2014a).
Although the negotiators were not completely clear as to who would get to go, they
mentioned, at that point, that “this delegation will be made up in such a manner as to
ensure the plural and balanced representation of the different victims, as well as of the
different victimizing events, but not intending to ensure that a delegation may represent
the millions of victims left by the armed conflict” (Alto Comisionado para la Paz,
2014a). Virginia Bouvier wrote, at the time, that “[w]ith more than 6.5 million victims
registered with the government’s Victims’ Unit, and tremendous diversity among them,
it will be difficult to ensure complete representation at the table” (Bouvier, 2014).
Indeed, despite the above-average level of organisation perceived among Colombian
victims, differences invariably led to some tensions over who would go to Havana. It
seemed, at first, that the ten to fifteen expected delegates would come from the Mesa
Nacional de Vı´ctimas – an organ that functions within the Victims’ Unit as a partici-
patory instance for formally identified victims and a product of the Law of Victims12
(Ley 1448 de 2011). Yet, concerns were raised that these choices could be influenced by
political preferences, and such a group would consequently not be a representative
sample of the totality of the conflict’s victims (La Silla Vacı´a, 2014a, 2014b).
On 17 July 2014, the delegations issued another communique´ to announce the
selection criteria for participants. It was announced then that the National University and
the UN would also be in charge of the selection process, with support from the Episcopal
Conference of Colombia (assigned with securing the observation of said criteria). The
main parameters for the choice of victims’ delegates would be
balance, pluralism and fairness, which should be reflected in the composition of each one of
the delegations. In particular, the delegations should reflect the whole universe of human
rights violations and IHL [international humanitarian law] infractions that have taken place
throughout the internal conflict, taking the different social sectors, populations and the
regional approach into account. [ . . . ] The delegations’ members shall be direct victims
of the conflict and they will participate in that capacity and not in representation of others.
The foregoing does not exclude the cases of collective victimization. (Alto Comisionado
para la Paz, 2014b, my emphasis)
The table established that it would welcome at least five delegations (one per cycle of
dialogues) of up to twelve people each, in what eventually totalled the sixty participants
that visited the Cuban capital from August to December of 2014. The declaration also
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signalled that negotiators would review the selection criteria with each visiting delega-
tion, making additional recommendations to selection agents if necessary.
At the occasion of the first delegation’s trip to Havana on 15 August, the three
institutions responsible for the choice of participants, seeking to elucidate and detail the
criteria established by the negotiation table, released a joint statement with further
explanation on the guiding principles of their work. It reaffirmed the table’s warning of
the impossibility of perfect representativeness, as well as its request that the delegations
contemplated the widest spectrum possible of victims, considering all types of victi-
misation from all categories of armed actors, from different affected territories and from
varied social sectors, with special attention to marginalised groups and a gender focus
(UNDP, 2014a). The institutions argued against calls for proportionality, claiming that
(i) some types of victims, such as the internally displaced, are quantitatively dis-
proportional in their large numbers, which could compromise the integration of
important albeit smaller groups of victims; and (ii) it was not their role to tally or
categorise the whole universe of the conflict’s victims, a job, in reality, to be fulfilled
later by the Truth Commission (p. 3).
Based on Rehfeld’s standards of representation (see Figure 4 above), the negotiation
table (alongside parties’ leaders) were the “audience” in the sense they came up with the
decision rule and were the one actor who needed to validate the choice of participants.
The National University of Colombia, UN Colombia, and the Episcopal Conference
were the “selection agents” whom – according to the selection criteria made public by
the parties’ delegations and considering the input received in regional and national
forums – in fact decided which victims were best suited to attend the debates. The
“represented,” finally, would be the conflict’s victims. It is worth noting that diverse
victims’ leaderships exerted pressure over both audience and selection agents during
the selection phase – hence the dashed arrows in Figure 4 – attempting in this manner
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Figure 4. Selection of Victims’ Delegations in the Colombian Peace Process. Source: Based on
Rehfeld (2006).
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to leave behind a mostly passive role of represented and infiltrate the two other
remaining circumferences in order to have a say in the decision rule and the selection
of delegates itself.
Although assessing the real impact of such pressure is a matter that remains to be
further dissected, it is important to highlight that the definition of the representative
function at hand (temporary participation at negotiation table discussions, with no
decision power) was off-reach for victims and hermetic to social pressure.13 In other
words, whereas the choice of participants seemed like a fairly open-ended conversation,
the actual role attributed to the victims that were picked was not up for debate.
The substantive facet of representation, on the other hand, brings attention to the issues
of representativeness (presence/descriptive representation) and policy impact by the vic-
tims’ delegates (action/“act for” representation). Despite the negotiators’ reluctance to
commit to proportionality or precise representativeness, it looks as if its request for balance
and pluralism in the composition of the five delegations was fulfilled. Women made up 60
per cent of the delegates, and a wide variety of victimisations were represented by victims or
their family members – kidnapping, massacres, forced displacement, gender-based and
sexual violence, homicide, child recruitment, disappearances, false positives,14 use of
prohibited weapons, violence against vulnerable ethnic groups, and so on. Roddy Brett
observes that the issue of victimisation variety was the single most difficult one to find
balance for, seeing that the political opposition wanted only victims of FARC to attend and
the FARC, in turn, was sensitive when it came to the numbers of victims from their vio-
lations (Brett, 2018: 281). Several social sectors were made present, from rural to urban,
from powerful politicians and well-known journalists to human rights and minorities’
activists of Afro-Colombian, indigenous, and women’s groups. Keeping in mind that
some territories were more affected by the conflict than others, the regional parameter
was also respected – twenty-eight out of the thirty-two Colombian departments were
represented.15 Still, for Camilo Villa, a member of the fifth delegation, “this is a par-
ticipation that lacks volume; [ . . . ] we know that 5 or 6 thousand people participated of
the forums, but only 60 made it to Havana” (Trindade Viana and Mendes, 2016).
Lastly, the action dimension of this representative process may be seen from different
perspectives. The initiative was celebrated as having made a lasting impression on
negotiators and therefore exercised indirect influence on the negotiations from that point
on. Brett argues “the encounter with victims and the clarity of their proposals provided the
negotiators with a framework concerning specific measures for the design of the victims’
accord” (2018: 292). At times, however, it seems as if the actual policy influence and
impact of the victims (their “performance”) stood beneath their own desired outcomes.
One of the proposals brought up in the national forum at Cali, for example, maintained that
“participation in the process is a right of the victims, as is its binding character” (UNDP,
2014f: 6, translated from Spanish). As mentioned earlier, however, the function performed
by the victims’ delegates was non-negotiable – they would share their experiences and
voice their proposals, but no binding pledges were made on the part of government and
FARC negotiators. Villa observes, in this regard, that “a lot of proposals were cut, mainly
the ones that called for a commitment of policy modification on the part of the Armed
Forces and the topic of state depuration” (Trindade Viana and Mendes, 2016).
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Ultimately, what lies at the bottom of this process is a certain contradiction between
the use of a language of representation and its simultaneous rejection. At the same time
that the negotiation table vowed to “ensure the plural and balanced representation of the
different victims” (Alto Comisionado para la Paz, 2014a), it was quick to clarify that
victims would “participate in that capacity and not in representation of others” (Alto
Comisionado para la Paz, 2014b). Much like the language adopted by the Conflict
Resolution literature, Colombian negotiators are interested in (attainable) representa-
tiveness, but refuse to recognise popular engagement in formal instances as political
representation. As a counterargument, one may say the delegates themselves did not
believe they would be able to represent the extremely multifaceted universe of
Colombia’s victims – something that perhaps many of the millions of victims who never
got to go to Havana would agree with.16
Even though the formal representative role was not there, as Brett concludes,
a cohesive and unified victim-led peacebuilding agenda began to emerge. This agenda emerged
directly out of the collective voice and thinking of the 60 members of the delegations, and
logically did not speak for all victims and their organisations. However, it began to gain
leverage at the national level and sought, to a degree, to represent itself as a formalised politics
of victimhood within the context of peacemaking and peacebuilding. In this respect, to a degree,
the delegations then amplified the voices of specific individual victims, while seeking
to represent partially the broader demands of victims’ organisations. (Brett, 2018: 287)
Ultimately, two main reflections come up from this discussion. First, going back to
the question I raised earlier – were the victims’ delegates representatives of Colombia’s
victims? Yes and no. It became clear from official discourse and even from the delegates
themselves that no official representative role was intended with the initiative. Using
Pitkin’s typology, formalistic and “act for” languages of representation were repeatedly
rejected in this process. On the descriptive side, however, representation was several
times invoked and encouraged – if not in a key of proportionality or much less in volume
of participation, definitely in the sense of a feeling of identification or incarnation
involved in having victims invited to the table to voice their grievances while facing
those responsible for their victimisation. The more repetitive use of the term
“participation” by the parties might interestingly have something to say about this –
perhaps it is seen as a more malleable label, involving demands easier to dismiss.
A second point is that representation allows for inclusion to be seen as a political
endeavour. Rehfeld’s view on representation opens the possibility of approaching
representation as a two-way street involving numerous actors that work through power
dynamics and collective mobilisation. As mentioned earlier, not only do existing
identities turn up in representation; representation itself – or those audiences defining
decision rules for recognising representation – help turn loose social groups into
collectivities by convening them as such. When it comes to the specific case of victims,
for example, Jacoby observes that “often [parallels between personal and group
experiences] are constructed on the victims’ behalf” (2015: 522). As opposed to
constituting a mere legitimising end in and of itself, approaching inclusive represen-
tation as another form of negotiated political contention permeated by power dynamics
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opens up the possibility of deeming inclusion a means towards the end of finally
granting long denied rights.
Final Remarks
This article tried to evidence the theoretical usefulness and potential empirical validity of
reframing inclusive mechanisms of peace negotiations in light of the concept of political
representation. While literature on the subject mostly speaks a language of inclusion, the
vagueness of the term ultimately conceals fundamental (political) aspects of efforts to
give voice to those social groups particularly affected by armed conflicts. The more
technical approach used by specialists, in turn, often treats inclusion as a legitimising
“bureaucratic box” to be checked off a list and makes no distinction between the notions
of participation and representation.
This discussion was illustrated through the Colombian peace process with the
FARC – emblematic in its intention to be both inclusive and effective – more spe-
cifically the invitation of victims’ delegations in 2014, in which all the above cited
issues manifested quite clearly. Official discourse showed clear preference for the
language of participation, rejecting that the role of victims’ delegates could be seen as
representative. Representation can be a thousand things at the same time, however; it
may be taken as the formal procedure behind the choice of representatives, but it is also
about a feeling of identification, a convincing act of incarnation, that allows for one to
think of a process as representative or not.
By refusing to accept the representative feature of the victims’ delegations while
focusing on the lack of the formal, clear mandate to perform a specific decision-making
function, they missed some of the most important aspects of representation involved in
this effort. While there were no formal authorising mechanisms for the delegates to
represent the complex universe of Colombia’s victims, the parties themselves widely
employed the representative lexicon in regard to substance, specifically in relation to the
goal of representativeness in the gathering of the group. The language of representation
is both utilised and discarded, and such selectivity may be important to deepen our
outlook on inclusive peace negotiations. While still walking a fine line between inclusion
and effectiveness, the representational lens inserts yet another tightrope into this equa-
tion – one between political interaction and the creation of “technical” models capable of
tracking concrete results. Therefore, more than simply treating inclusion as a condition
for the creation of legitimacy, political representation in this context interacts with
participatory initiatives and underscores, above all, the realisation of long denied rights.
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Notes
1. This process is deeply related to the human rights regime, as well as mechanisms of transi-
tional justice, which became a core theme in the post–Cold War environment (Lutz et al.,
2003; Vinjamuri and Snyder, 2004).
2. http://graduateinstitute.ch/home/research/centresandprogrammes/ccdp/ccdp-research/clus
ters-and-projects-1/participatory-peace-processes-an/broadening-participation-in-trac.html.
3. Galtung (1967).
4. A similar argument may be found in Saward (2006, 2010).
5. Gerrymandering, a term inspired by the salamander-shaped district drawn by American poli-
tician Elbridge Gerry, is the practice of manipulating definition of electoral districts for
political gains (Cox and Katz, 2002).
6. Unidad Nacional de Vı´ctimas. See more: https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es/registro-
unico-de-victimas-ruv/37394.
7. Unidad Nacional de Vı´ctimas. See more: https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es/registro-
unico-de-victimas-ruv/37394.
8. The points in discussion were rural reform development, political participation, the end of the
conflict, the drug problem, victims, and mechanisms of implementation, verification, and
popular approval.
9. In the plebiscite held on 2 October 2016, the first agreement was rejected by the Colombians
by a very thin margin. The defeat prompted a “National Dialogue” that reopened the discus-
sion of a few points with diverse sectors of society. The agreement was then successfully
submitted to Congress approval.
10. They were ten: recognition of the victims, recognition of responsibility, satisfaction of the
victims’ rights, victim participation, elucidation of the truth, reparation of the victims, guar-
antees of protection and security, guarantee of non-repetition, principle of reconciliation, and
rights-oriented approach (Alto Comisionado para la Paz, 2014a).
11. Regional forums were held in Villavicencio (4 and 5 July 2014), Barrancabermeja (10 and 11
July 2014), and Barranquilla (17 and 18 July 2014). The national forum was held in Cali (3 and
4 August 2014). The choice of locations paid attention to regions most affected by the conflict
(Presidencia de la Repu´blica, 2014).
12. http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/registroEspecialArchivos/
Decreto4800-11RegalmentarioLey1448-11.pdf.
13. The above-cited rule n. 6 of the General Agreement makes it clear that third party participation
at the table would happen at the discretion of both sides’ negotiators.
14. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/colombia0615sp_4up.pdf.
15. For more information of the profile of the delegations, see UNDP (2014a, 2014b, 2014c,
2014d, 2014e).
16. This argument was presented to me in an interview with a government official who worked
in the peace process and declared that the delegates themselves saw the representative label
as a burden. This interview was conducted in Bogota´ in November 2018 as part of my
ongoing PhD research.
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